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Article summary 
European philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries proposed a wide range 
of views about the nature of the mind and its relation to the body.  
René Descartes (1596-1650) argued that there are two distinct parts to human 
beings, mind and body, which are of radically different kinds, and either of which could exist 
without the other – although in fact, in living humans, they are always connected together. 
This belief in two substances of two kinds is why Descartes is sometimes called a dualist. He 
argued for dualism in several works, including his Meditations on First Philosophy (Descartes 
1641). Elsewhere, in his Discourse on the Method (Descartes 1637) he argued – based on 
empirical observation of the difference between humans and other animals – that reason is 
unique to humans. Indeed Descartes thought that, because non-human animals do not have 
an incorporeal mind, they do not even really have sensations. 
 Though Descartes’s views have been very influential, they attracted critics from the 
outset. For example, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) argued against Descartes that the 
thinking mind is corporeal, Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) objected to Descartes’s method of 
investigating the mind, and Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680) objected to his 
explanation – or lack of explanation – of how the incorporeal mind and the corporeal body 
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are related to one another. 
 Questions about that relationship continued to divide philosophers in the generation 
after Descartes. In different ways, occasionalists such as Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) 
and the anti-occasionalist Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) both denied that distinct 
created substances (such as the Cartesian mind and body) could really have a causal influence 
on each other. Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) denied this too, in his own way, while also 
arguing for a claim that sounds materialistic, that mind and body are the very same thing 
“expressed in two ways” (Spinoza [1677] 1988:2p7s). Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, 
were more straightforwardly materialists, arguing that the structure and movements of 
various corporeal systems gave rise to thought. Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673), meanwhile, 
was a materialist who argued that matter itself was fundamentally and irreducibly thinking. 
 The Hobbesian sort of materialism seeks to explain the mind in terms of the body. 
Idealism, on the other hand, seeks to explain the body in terms of the mind. This is the view 
that what there are, fundamentally, are incorporeal thinking things and their states (e.g., 
thoughts, ideas, and perceptions). Material stuff somehow depends on these more basic 
things. Leibniz proposed this view at some points, as did the eighteenth-century philosopher 
George Berkeley (1685-1753).  
Descartes’s views about animals’ lack of minds also continued to attract attention. A 
wide range of philosophers thought he must have gone wrong here. This debate has 
complex connections to others. For example, if you believe that animals can think, but you 
also believe that thought requires an incorporeal soul, what should you say about animals’ 
incorporeal souls? Where do they go when an animal dies and their body decays? 
Dualistic, anti-materialist views were sometimes connected to the notion of 
simplicity. The idea was that the soul was a simple, indivisible thing, unlike corporeal things 
such as human brains. Various philosophers thought they could prove that the soul had to 
be simple, and thus that it could not be corporeal. Leibniz (again), Christian Wolff (1679-
1754), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) discussed such issues. 
 
1. Descartes 
René Descartes argued that there is an incorporeal part of human beings, which is their mind 
or soul, and is what allows them to be rational and conscious. In his technical terminology, 
he believed that there is a real distinction between mind and body. This means that a 
human’s mind and their body are two distinct substances, and that either could possibly exist 
without the other – although in fact, in living human beings, mind and body are always 
paired together. Moreover, the mind and body are of two different kinds, having different 
principal attributes, or essences. The essence of mind is thinking, and all other features of a 
mind depend in some way on this. Typically we might think of them as ways of thinking. 
The essence of body, meanwhile, is extension, and all other features of body depend on this. 
Descartes argues for that view of the mind in the sixth of his 1641 Meditations on First 
Philosophy. The subtitle of the first edition of that work claimed that it demonstrated “the 
immortality of the soul” (Descartes [1641] 1984:1). The second edition moderated that claim, 
saying only that the work demonstrated “the distinction between the human soul and the 
body” (Descartes [1641] 1984:12). Still, we can see why Descartes might have thought that 
showing the mind to be really distinct from the body was a step towards showing it was 
immortal. A mind that is really distinct from body would presumably not be subject to 
processes of bodily decay. So though the body may decompose after death, or be cremated, 
neither of these would affect an incorporeal being, such as Descartes thought he had shown 
the mind to be. Thus it is at least possible that the mind is immortal, and a significant 
obstacle to believing in any sort of human immortality – the decay of the body after death – 
is removed. 
The Sixth Meditation argument for the real distinction relies heavily on Descartes’s 
notion of clear and distinct perception or understanding. This sort of perception, Descartes 
believes, is undeniable – “so long as I believe something very clearly and distinctly I cannot 
but believe it to be true” (Descartes [1641] 1984:48) – and – because of the way God has 
created us and the rest of the world – gives us a reliable insight into things. In this argument, 
Descartes begins from the thought that everything I clearly and distinctly understand can be 
created by God. That is, it is in an important sense possible. Moreover, Descartes says, if I 
can clearly and distinctly understand two things, A and B, “apart from” one another 
(Descartes [1641] 1984:54), then I can be sure that God could create either without the 
other, and thus that they are really distinct, are two different substances (even if they both 
happen to exist and be connected in the actual world). But I also perceive facts about the 
nature of myself, or my mind – it is a thinking, unextended thing – and about the nature of 
body – that it is an extended thing. This, Descartes claims, shows that I can understand them 
apart from one another. Thus they are, given the previous claims, really distinct. 
In his earlier Discourse on the Method (Descartes 1637), Descartes had offered a rather 
different set of reasons for his view of mind and body. These rely on empirical observation 
of the differences between human beings and non-human animals. The first difference 
Descartes draws attention to involves language. Though animals make noises, and indeed 
parrots can speak human words, non-human animals cannot, Descartes thinks, “show that 
they are thinking what they are saying” (Descartes [1637] 1985:140). Meanwhile, humans can 
use language. Descartes thinks that this shows a sharp difference in kind between humans, 
who have reason, and all other animals, which lack it. Secondly, Descartes observes the way 
that animals do some things much better than us, but other things much worse. A cheetah, 
for instance, can run faster than any human, but can make no start at all in many activities 
performed by humans. It cannot read philosophy books, or knit a scarf, or row a boat. Many 
humans do not do these particular things either: but very many humans could learn to do 
them, though no cheetahs could. Thus Descartes argues that animals, unlike human beings, 
are like specialized biological machines, designed and made to do one thing. Human beings 
though, with their faculty of reason, can adapt themselves to many things. These arguments 
from the Discourse are not, directly, arguments for the real distinction argued for in the 
Meditations. They are, however, arguments that human beings have a unique mental ability, 
reason. Reason, Descartes thought, must belong to an incorporeal mind. 
 
2. Early critics of Descartes 
When Descartes’s Meditations were first published, they were accompanied by several sets of 
Objections from other philosophers, as well as Descartes’s Replies. Thomas Hobbes, later to 
become famous as a political philosopher, was the author of the Third Set of Objections 
(Hobbes 1641). Hobbes suggested, in contrast to Descartes, the possibility of materialism 
about the human mind, the thing that has reason. His materialist account relies upon the 
powers of language in order to explain our reasoning ability. Our use of language does not, 
Hobbes thought, require us to have any mental faculty over and above the imagination – 
certainly not the sort of incorporeal rational faculty Descartes thought we possessed, with its 
ability to have clear and distinct intellectual perception of the natures of things. Instead, 
“reasoning will depend on names, names will depend on the imagination, and imagination 
will depend … merely on the motions of our bodily organs; and so the mind will be nothing 
more than motion occurring in various parts of an organic body” (Hobbes [1641] 1984:126).  
Pierre Gassendi was a French contemporary of Descartes’s, who had been professor 
of philosophy at the university of Aix, and would later be professor of mathematics at the 
Collège Royal in Paris. He was the author of the Fifth Set of Objections to the Meditations 
(Gassendi 1641). Later, wrote a further book containing objections to Descartes’s Replies 
(Gassendi 1644). Of particular note here is the way Descartes and Gassendi disagreed about 
how we ought to investigate the nature of the mind. Descartes thought that rational 
reflection and clear and distinct perception could lead us to knowledge of the mind’s 
essence, which is its principal attribute, thinking. Gassendi thought this was the wrong 
picture of what we need to do to achieve “the kind of knowledge which is superior to 
common knowledge” (Gassendi [1641] 1984:193). He compared Descartes’s investigation of 
the mind to an investigation of wine. To say that the mind is a thinking thing is like saying 
“wine is a liquid thing, which is compressed from grapes, white or red, sweet, intoxicating” 
(Gassendi [1641] 1984:193). This kind of superficial description is not what we are after. 
Rather, to have superior knowledge about the wine, you want to “explain its internal 
substance, showing how it can be seen to be manufactured from spirits, tartar, the distillate, 
and other ingredients mixed together in such and such quantities and proportions” 
(Gassendi [1641] 1984:193). That is, you want to investigate it chemically. And analogously, 
Gassendi said, to understand the mind we want “a kind of chemical investigation” of it 
(Gassendi [1641] 1984:193), which Descartes failed to provide –  and which his method is 
perhaps not suited to provide. 
A third early critic of Descartes was Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, who 
corresponded with him in the 1640s. Early in their correspondence, she asked Descartes 
about his views about mind and body, and in particular about how they were related to each 
other. In the Meditations, Descartes had emphasized that there is a peculiarly close 
relationship between the human mind and body. He had denied that we should think of the 
mind and body on the model of a sailor in a ship. On that model, there is causal influence in 
both directions, and the mind observes and controls the body. But that, Descartes thought, 
was not a close enough relationship: mind and body are “very closely joined and, as it were, 
intermingled” (Descartes [1641] 1984:56). Nevertheless, one might still ask what exactly this 
relationship is. And, as Elisabeth did, one might ask how they are able to interact at all. 
Bodies, in Descartes’s picture of the physical world, are affected by being pushed by other 
bodies they are in contact with. But it seems that an incorporeal, non-extended mind is the 
wrong sort of thing to push on anything. So how, Elisabeth asked, can the Cartesian mind 
affect the body (Elisabeth [1643] 2007:62)? 
Replying to Elisabeth, Descartes sketched an apparently new theory, involving three 
“primitive notions that are like originals on the pattern of which we form all our other 
knowledge” (Descartes [1643] 2007:65). In understanding the body alone, we use the notion 
of extension. In understanding the soul alone, we use the notion of thought. But we also, 
Descartes says, have a third notion, of their union. Trying to understand mind-body 
interaction using the notion of extension, and the model of bodies pushing on each other, is 
doomed to failure. But we have this additional notion of the union, involving the power of 
minds to act on bodies. We can understand those interactions well enough, Descartes thinks, 
and do so quite naturally, as long as we do not try to force them into the other model. 
 
3. Occasionalism and pre-established harmony 
Descartes’ philosophical influence was such that he came to have a considerable number of 
philosophical followers, known as Cartesians. Among those Cartesians, many were also 
occasionalists. The most famous of the early modern European occasionalists was Nicolas 
Malebranche, author of the Search after Truth (1674–5) and Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion 
(1678). 
Occasionalism is, in the first instance, a view about causation. In its simplest and 
strongest version, it is the view that only God has causal powers. All other things – all finite, 
created things – lack causal powers. Thus even if finite beings, including humans and their 
minds, seem to be the causes of things, there is an important and fundamental sense in 
which they are not, because only God can really cause something to happen. Things other 
than God are said, rather, to be only occasional causes. Thus, for example, on the occasion 
of my deciding to make some tea, I walk to the kitchen and put the kettle on. But neither I, 
nor my decision, is really the thing with causal power. Only God has that. So it seems we 
must say that, according to the occasionalist, it was God, not me, who caused the change in 
the state of the kettle. 
Occasionalism is, then, a general view about causation, and about God’s relationship 
to the world. However, it can also appear to provide an answer to the puzzle about mind-
body interaction that Elisabeth posed for Descartes. Put simply, the answer is that the mind 
can have no effect at all on the body. But this is not because of some defect of the mind, or 
some weakness of Descartes’s system. Rather it is because the mind is a finite, created thing, 
and no created things have any causal power at all, for that belongs only to God. The mind 
does change on the occasion of changes in the body, but this is the work of God, not of the 
motions of corporeal things. 
One of occasionalism’s most prominent opponents was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. 
He attacked the occasionalist view for postulating too many miracles. To think that God, 
rather than some finite substance, was the cause of some change in a finite substance, was to 
think of God as intervening miraculously into the world every time something happened, 
Leibniz thought. Leibniz took this to be the wrong sort of explanation to give. Thus he said 
in his “New System” (Leibniz 1695) that “in solving problems it is not sufficient to make use 
of the general cause and to invoke what is called a Deus ex machina. For when one does that 
without giving any other explanation derived from the order of secondary causes, it is, 
properly speaking, having recourse to miracle” (Leibniz [1695] 1989:143). That is, an 
explanation of an event in the natural world ought to involve another event in the natural 
world (what Leibniz here calls a “secondary cause”) not simply an appeal to God. 
Leibniz’s own system also contained surprising claims about causation, however. In 
his picture, finite substances still do have some causal powers: an earlier state of a substance 
is genuinely the cause of a later state of it. But Leibniz thought that no finite created 
substance could, fundamentally, cause a change in any other. Rather, he believed that all the 
created substances evolved harmoniously. Suppose, for example, that you say something 
(“Leibniz wore a wig”) and a friend listens to you and comes to believe it. Their believing it 
does have a cause, but fundamentally for Leibniz that cause was an earlier state of your 
friend, not your saying what you did. God, however, created you and your friend so that 
your states would be synchronized, the belief arising just after your utterance. This is what 
Leibniz calls the pre-established harmony. 
That view, like occasionalism, is a general view about causation. But like 
occasionalism, it might be employed in answer to puzzles about mind-body interaction. As 
Leibniz says, again in the “New System”: “It is this mutual relation, regulated in advance in 
each substance of the universe, which produces what we call their communication, and which 
alone brings about the union of soul and body” (Leibniz [1695] 1989:144). Here, as indeed with 
occasionalism, there are complications. Not the least of these involves understanding what 
Leibniz thinks bodies actually are: many have thought he was an idealist (see §5). But we can 
at least see a possible view here: states of a mind are explained by its earlier states, states of a 
body are explained by its earlier states, and neither mind nor body exercises causal power on 
the other, but their states evolve harmoniously, thanks to the way God created the world. 
 
4. Materialism 
Hobbes, as is suggested by his Objections to Descartes’s Meditations, was a sort of materialist 
about the human mind. We can see this in other works too, such as the early chapters of his 
Leviathan (Hobbes 1651), in which he explains the various powers of the mind – sensation, 
memory, imagination, language, reason – without seeing any need to postulate an incorporeal 
part of human beings. Certainly Hobbes’s views are strikingly different from those of, say, 
Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz. Nevertheless, Hobbes was far from the only 
materialist. The rest of this section provides some examples of materialist views among 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European philosophers. 
Someone who knew Hobbes was Margaret Cavendish, the Duchess of Newcastle. 
She published her own materialist philosophy in several books of the 1650s and 1660s, such 
as her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (Cavendish 1666). Cavendish disagreed with 
Hobbes and others who thought that the motions of parts of matter could explain why some 
material systems could think. Cavendish thought, instead, that matter was fundamentally and 
irreducibly thinking stuff. Combining this with the view that the world is wholly material, she 
thought that many things other than humans could, in their own way, think and have 
knowledge: not just animals, but also vegetables and even minerals. 
Cavendish’s materialism, like Hobbes’s, is there on the surface for all to see. It is 
more difficult to know what to say about their contemporary Benedict Spinoza. It is clear 
from his Ethics (Spinoza 1677) that Spinoza thought there was just one substance, with 
attributes that include thought and extension. Seeing this, one might be inclined to think he 
too was a sort of materialist, one who thought that the whole world was one extended, 
thinking thing. But this is far from the only way to read Spinoza, and many interpreters 
would strongly oppose the suggestion that he was a materialist. For example, one tradition of 
interpretation holds that he was an idealist, taking the attribute of thought as more basic. 
 Nevertheless, Spinoza clearly did hold that in some sense the human mind and the 
human body are identical – that they are “one and the same thing, but expressed in two 
ways” (Spinoza [1677] 1988:2p7s). And claims of mind-body identity are typically, these 
days, associated with materialism. Moreover, he thought that the relations between mental 
things were exactly parallel to the relations between physical things: “The order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (Spinoza [1677] 
1988:2p7). There is a causal structure in the physical world, and a causal structure in the 
mental world, and they mirror each other exactly, though there is no causal interaction 
between them. 
John Locke (1632-1704) seems to be agnostic about materialism in his Essay concerning 
Human Understanding and other works. He does say, however, that it is possible that God 
gave “to certain Systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some 
degrees of sense, perception, and thought” (Locke [1689] 1975: 4.3.6). Thus, our minds 
might perhaps be material, even though God himself could not be. Locke did not, however, 
assert that materialism was true. Moreover, he held that some materialist arguments (e.g., the 
argument that we should not believe in an immaterial mind because it is inconceivable) were 
bad arguments. 
Locke’s seemingly moderate concession, that a sort of materialism might possibly be 
true, caused significant concern. Thus Leibniz wrote that “Natural religion itself seems to 
decay [in England] very much. Many will have human souls to be material … Mr. Locke and 
his followers are uncertain, at least, whether the soul is not material and naturally perishable” 
(Leibniz [1715] 1989:320). In talking of Locke’s followers, Leibniz was perhaps thinking of 
John Toland (1670-1722) or Anthony Collins (1676-1729). Meanwhile Pierre Bayle noted 
Locke’s view in his popular Dictionary, objecting (in note M to the article “Dichaearchus”) to 
what he took to be Locke’s combination of views: that thinking matter is incomprehensible, 
and that God could make matter think (Bayle [1696] 1991, 72–4). 
One should not think, despite the above examples, that all early modern materialists 
were English speakers. There were for example several famous French materialists. These 
included Julien Offroy de la Mettrie (1709-1751), author of L’Homme machine (Machine Man, 
1747), and Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789), author of the Système de la nature 
(System of Nature, 1770). Holbach, for example, argued that “those who have supposed in 
man an immaterial substance, distinguished from his body, have not thoroughly understood 
themselves” (Holbach [1770] 1889:1.48). Having reviewed various problems with the notion 
of an immaterial soul he concluded that “such a substance is a chimera; a being of the 
imagination” (Holbach [1770] 1889:1.49). He argued that the soul is, instead, “only the body 
itself considered relatively to some of its functions” (Holbach [1770] 1889:1.52).  
 
5. Idealism 
One could think of idealism as the opposite of materialism. A materialist such as Hobbes 
thinks that the world is made entirely of matter, and that everything, including minds and 
their thoughts, is somehow constructed from that material stuff and its motions. A 
stereotypical idealist holds instead that what there are fundamentally are (immaterial) minds 
and their thoughts. Everything else, matter included, is somehow constructed from them.  
Again, Leibniz provides a good example, though complexities of interpretation mean 
it is not an entirely uncontroversial one. As Leibniz wrote to the Leiden professor Burcher 
de Volder (1643-1709) in 1704, “there is nothing in things but simple substances, and in 
them, perception and appetite” (Leibniz [1704] 1989:). The states of simple substances are 
mental ones, perceptions and appetites – what we might call thoughts and desires. And 
Leibniz did not think that bodies were simple substances. So somehow – and how is a big 
question – he thought that the entire material world was founded solely in these simple 
thinking things. 
One approach to that question (seemingly not Leibniz’s) would be to identify the 
material things with the perceptions that minds have of them. Such an approach seems to 
appear in the work of George Berkeley. Berkeley was another who held an idealist view, 
which he called immaterialism (Berkeley [1713] 1949:257). He argued against the existence of 
material substance, something that underlies and gives rise to qualities (and ultimately then 
perceptions). Instead, he argues, there are minds (or spirits) and ideas. Everyday objects are, 
in fact, ideas, not the (mysterious) material substances philosophers have claimed they are. 
As one character summarizes the view toward the end of Berkeley’s Three Dialogues: 
My endeavours tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that truth, which was 
before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: the former being of opinion, 
that those things they immediately perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things 
immediately perceived, are ideas which exist only in the mind. Which two notions put 
together, do in effect constitute the substance of what I advance (Berkeley [1713] 
1949:262). 
Thus, Berkeley did not look to deny the existence of things that we would often think of as 
bodies: rocks and trees, tables and chairs. Rather, he took himself to be disagreeing with 
various philosophers about what those things ultimately are. They are, he argues, the very 
things we directly perceive (thus, our ideas) rather than something that underlies or gives rise 
to them (matter, material substance, substratum). 
 
6. Animal minds 
Many early modern debates about mind and body were about the nature of human minds 
and their relation to human bodies. There was also an important related debate about the 
nature of other animals’ minds.  
Again, Descartes provides an interesting starting point. For while he holds that 
humans have reason, language, and a soul, he thinks that other animals lack all those things. 
Such an animal is a sort of biological machine or automaton. Moreover, if we combine this 
with Descartes’s view that sensation involves the immaterial soul (Descartes [1637] 
1985:164), it turns out that other animals do not even have sensation. 
This view was unsurprisingly not persuasive to all. Thus, for example, Spinoza 
argued that “we can by no means doubt that beasts have feelings” (Spinoza [1677] 
1988:3p57s) – though he also thought that nothing about their having feelings should stop 
us “making use of them as we please and dealing with them as best suits us” (Spinoza [1677] 
1988:4p37s1). Later Bayle, in his Dictionary, reported arguments on both sides of the debate 
in notes to the article “Rorarius”. The Cartesian view does appear to have a theological 
advantage in making a strong distinction between humans and other animals (Bayle [1696] 
1991:216–21). If animals have immaterial souls, one must ask whether those souls are 
immortal, whether they could be subject to eternal punishment, and so on. All these 
difficulties are avoided by simply denying that non-human animals have souls in the first 
place. But on the other side, Bayle praises the arguments of Gabriel Daniel (1649-1728) in 
his 1690 La voyage du monde de Descartes. Daniel, Bayle reports, claims that “the arguments of 
the Cartesians lead us to judge that other men are machines” too (Bayle [1696] 1991:231). 
Later still, David Hume would argue that it is entirely obvious that Descartes is 
wrong about this issue. As he began his discussion “Of the reason of animals” (Treatise 
1.3.16): 
Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to 
defend it; and no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow’d 
with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this case so obvious, 
that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant (Hume [1739] 2001:1.3.16.1). 
That is, Hume thought it was simply obvious that non-human animals could think, and that 
it would be ridiculous to follow Descartes in denying this – or, indeed, to spend a long time 
arguing against him. Moreover, Hume argues that, where we see similar behaviour in 
humans and animals, we should think there are similar internal causes. Thus we should think, 
unlike Descartes, that animals have thought and reason. More generally, Hume thinks that 
animal minds, and their similarities to human minds, give us evidence that many theories of 
human minds are wrong. Hume notes that many of the things done by human minds are 
also done by animal minds. In these cases, we should expect the explanations to be similar 
too. So whatever the explanation is, it should be one we can happily give in the animal case: 
not something involving very complex cognition that we would only want to attribute to 
humans. As Hume puts the point: 
The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employ’d to account 
for the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a subtility and refinement of 
thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of mere animals, but even of children and 
the common people in our own species; who are notwithstanding susceptible of the 
same emotions and affections as persons of the most accomplish’d genius and 
understanding. Such a subtility is a clear proof of the falshood, as the contrary 
simplicity of the truth, of any system (Hume [1739] 2001:1.3.16.3). 
 
7. Simplicity 
Another theme that emerged repeatedly in modern discussions of the nature of the soul was 
that of simplicity, of the soul being a simple thing. Simplicity itself was often connected to 
immateriality, because material things – in particular the material things that seem the mostly 
likely candidates to be material minds, such as brains – are complex systems. This 
connection of simplicity and immateriality is sometimes associated with a famous passage in 
Leibniz’s “Monadology” in which he uses the example of a mill. 
Moreover, we must confess that the perception, and what depends on it, is 
inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons, that is, through shapes and motions. If 
we imagine that there is a machine whose structure makes it think, sense, and have 
perceptions, we could conceive it enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we 
could enter into it, as one enters into a mill. Assuming that, when inspecting its 
interior, we will only find parts that push one another, and we will never find 
anything to explain a perception. And so, we should seek perception in the simple 
substance and not in the composite or in the machine (Leibniz [1714] 1989:215). 
Leibniz concludes here that nothing complex or mechanical could ever explain perception or 
thought. Rather, he asserts, perception is done by simple substances. But why can the 
composite not explain perception? One possibility is that Leibniz is offering an argument 
from inconceivability: an argument that starts from the thought that we cannot conceive or 
understand how a mechanical device, large or small, could give rise to thought. This 
inconceivability is used as evidence that a thinking material thing is impossible, and thus that 
thinking things must be immaterial simple substances. 
Christian Wolff is often thought of as a follower of Leibniz. Indeed, one reads 
references to the “Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy”, which might suggest they held a sort of 
unified view. As always in these matters, the details are rather more complicated. But we 
definitely can find Wolff echoing Leibnizian themes about the soul being a simple thinking 
thing, quite unlike material things.  
Because a body cannot think according to its essence and its nature, and because 
neither a body nor matter can be given the power to think, the soul cannot be 
anything corporeal and cannot consist of matter. And since it is clear … that thought 
cannot be attributed to a composite thing, the soul must be a simple thing (Wolff 
[1720] 2009:48). 
Though they are not arguing in exactly the same way, both Wolff and Leibniz are attracted 
to the idea that only simple things can think. If that claim could be supported, it would 
appear to provide the possibility for an argument for the soul’s immateriality, on the grounds 
that material things are complex, not simple. Now, someone might suggest that there are 
simple material things: atoms or some other sort of fundamental particle. But those are 
usually not the material things to which people want to attribute thought: human beings or 
human bodies or brains, all of which are complex. 
Immanuel Kant later discussed these issues of simplicity and immateriality in his 
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1781). This discussion occurs in particular in the “Second 
Paralogism: Of simplicity”. Here Kant discusses an argument, related to those of Leibniz 
and Wolff, that the soul cannot be a complex thing, such as a material system, but must 
instead be simple: “For because the representations that are divided among different beings 
… never make up a whole thought … the thought can never inhere in a composite as such. 
Thus it is possible only in a one substance, which is not an aggregate of many, is hence it is 
absolutely simple” (Kant [1781] 1999:A352). Moreover, Kant notes that the reason why 
people want to show the simplicity of the soul is to show that it is not corporeal (Kant 
[1781] 1999:A356–7). However, he argues, one cannot do what some have hoped to do here. 
He agrees there is a sort of simplicity of consciousness – my thoughts are somehow all 
collected together and belong to me, one thinker. However, he also argues that “the 
simplicity of consciousness is thus no acquaintance with the simple nature of our subject, 
insofar as this subject is supposed thereby to be distinguished from matter as a composite 
being” (Kant [1781] 1999:A360). The details of his objections are interwoven with his own 
terminology and approach. But there is a more general question we can surely ask, separate 
from the details of his views: even if our experience as thinking things involves a certain 
(subjective) simplicity, why should we take that to show the (objective, metaphysical) 
simplicity of the thinking thing itself? 
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